Normalization in the Middle East: Misconceptions and Implications
Here's what you need to know, and what coverage might've missed, about Israel formalizing ties with four Arab states.
In recent months, four Arab nations established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Coinciding with a contentious American election, these agreements, brokered by the United States, were touted as a foreign policy success by the incumbent Trump administration. Certainly, they represent a dramatic shift in Israel’s diplomatic isolation from the broader Middle East (previously, the only Arab states to recognize Israel were Egypt and Jordan, as well as the State of Palestine in limited contexts). But it’s worth taking a step back and examining the implications of normalization and the history of Israel’s diplomatic relations with other countries in the Middle East.
The circumstances of Israel’s creation in 1948 and the subsequent Palestinian refugee crisis irreversibly strained relations with neighboring nations. In fact, the entire Arab League and numerous Muslim-majority countries refused to recognize Israel at all. In the immediate vicinity, only Turkey and eventually Iran recognized Israel. Aside from some informal ties, this remained the case until Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979. Four years later, in 1983, Israel and Lebanon agreed on a framework for normalization, but this coincided with Israeli and Syrian military occupations and a civil war in Lebanon. Within a year, Lebanon repudiated the framework, classifying Israel as an enemy state to this day.
Ultimately, aside from conflicts with specific states, Israel’s historic obstacle to normalization has always been its conflict with the Palestinians. Progress was made in the early 1990’s, when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a series of agreements. In an exchange of letters in 1993, the PLO recognized Israel, while Israel accepted the PLO as the “representative of the Palestinian people”. The PLO declared statehood several years earlier, but Israel never recognized it. Representation, rather than recognition, satisfied the PLO as an interim solution, and negotiations commenced. During this period, Israel established full diplomatic relations with Jordan, which stand to this day, and low-level trade relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and Qatar. Relations with the latter four countries broke during the Second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising in the early 2000’s. However, informal contacts remained, both with these countries and others, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Until this year, the conventional wisdom, reinforced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, was that Israel would make peace with the Palestinians and then be accepted by most, if not all, Arab countries as a legitimate state. However, the stalled peace process and continued violence leave little hope for a mutually satisfactory outcome in the near future. As such, Israel commenced efforts to bypass the local peace process entirely and normalize relations with Arab countries separately. This paid off for Israel once the Trump administration began putting American diplomatic capital behind Israel’s push for normalization. Between August and December 2020, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco agreed to normalize relations with Israel, establishing full diplomatic relations.
Each of these countries normalized on different terms, but it’s worth taking a step back and examining what these agreements are and are not.
First off, what are the normalization agreements not?
They’re not, strictly speaking, “peace” deals. Israel never fought the countries involved directly (Morocco and Sudan did send small military contingents to fight alongside Israel’s other adversaries, but the last time this happened was almost half a century ago) and has no territorial disputes with them. Though all four, along with the rest of the Arab League, maintained an economic boycott and supported the Palestinian cause politically, a true war was never in the cards.
Though they certainly change a regional paradigm, they are not a radical break from the past. These countries long had some level of friendly relations with Israel. Morocco in particular cooperated with Israeli intelligence services for decades and allowed Israeli passport holders to visit. More recently, the UAE and Bahrain find themselves on the same side as Israel vis-à-vis Iran - and increasingly, Turkey.
Little evidence exists connecting the normalization agreements with resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the UAE claimed normalization was needed to prevent Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, annexation plans were already delayed. And, Israeli PM Netanyahu fully intends to follow through with annexation… eventually. If anything, by further weakening Palestinian leverage and the principles of the Arab Peace Initiative (normalization in exchange for resolving the conflict), normalization puts a solution further out of reach.
Despite the apparent warm ties between Israel and the countries it normalized relations with (especially the UAE), public opinion in the Arab world is almost uniformly hostile to Israel. None of the countries involved are true democracies, with only Morocco coming close as a “hybrid regime” according to the Democracy Index. As such, the risk of normalization to these governments is minimal, though it does create discontent.
Next, how did normalization come about?
The UAE was the first of the four countries to enter into an agreement with Israel. Officially, it was tied to Israel halting annexation. Despite how tenuous this halt is, it is important to the UAE, as one of its regional goals is containing the Muslim Brotherhood. Annexation would embolden the Brotherhood, in particular in Jordan where it is the primary opposition group. Israel, too, opposes the Muslim Brotherhood, but its primary concern is Iran. Here there is an alignment of interests as well, despite Iran being a secondary consideration to the Emiratis. The UAE also seeks to soften Israeli opposition to its potential purchase of F-35 jets from the US, which appears to have been successful.
Bahrain is much less influential than the UAE in its own right, but is backed by Saudi Arabia. By normalizing relations with Israel, Bahrain proved that Riyadh approves of the move, consistent with usual assessments of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the Saudi end, a more conservative population and regional considerations mean that normalization is improbable as long as King Salman (who is known to support the Palestinian cause) is still alive. However, allowing Bahrain to normalize is evidence of support within the Saudi leadership, driven by Mohammed bin Salman.
Facilitating Sudan’s normalization with Israel represents a clear use of American leverage. While Sudan’s transitional government previously stated it didn’t have a mandate to establish ties with Israel, the allure of removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list proved too strong. Inclusion on this list isolated Sudan from global markets and blocked desperately-needed aid, giving Sudan an incentive to comply with the American push for normalization. Tying normalization with dropping STT status undermines the purpose of the list, but, in this case, the Trump administration is willing to risk credibility in order to achieve diplomatic aims.
Morocco followed a similar paradigm. In exchange for normalizing relations with Israel, it received American recognition of its sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara region. The US is now the first country to definitively recognize the Western Sahara as part of Morocco, bypassing international negotiations over the territory. On the domestic front, normalization antagonizes the Islamist ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD). However, the agreement was driven by the monarchy, which delivered a win for the country in the form of Western Sahara recognition.
Finally, what does the future hold? Normalization with Saudi Arabia would be the most significant agreement for Israel, but this will take time. Oman, Comoros, Djibouti and Mauritania have all been named as candidates for future normalization, with Oman in particular indicating willingness in the past. The Trump administration is also said to be pressuring countries like Pakistan and Indonesia, but they remain elusive. With the countries that already normalized, there is potential for cooperation with Israel in numerous areas, most importantly business ties, tourism, and regional politics.
Popular discontent across the Middle East and North Africa is notable, but is unlikely to materialize into open defiance of authoritarian governments in the region. On the Israeli end, these agreements provide a much-needed boon for the beleaguered Netanyahu, and legitimize the absence of negotiations with the Palestinians. However, domestic criticism of Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption scandal and his haphazard response to the coronavirus consume much of the public attention. For the US, the problematic nature of the Sudanese and Moroccan deal hurt American standing internationally, but not significantly. With Trump soon to leave office, their impact on domestic politics is negligible as well, but they do epitomize this administration’s tendency towards transactional politics.
Going forward, regional actors will have to adjust to a new reality in which normalization with Israel is accepted. Meanwhile, future American administrations must choose to use diplomatic leverage responsibly. Overall, a new regional order will ease trade and some aspects of diplomacy, but care should be taken to safeguard human rights and stability.